) study so-called allocation problems and claim to characterize all rules satisfying efficiency, independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity on two preference domains (Ehlers and Klaus 2003, Theorem 1). They explicitly prove Theorem 1 for preference domain R 0 which requires that the null object is always the worst object and mention that the corresponding proofs for the larger domain R of unrestricted preferences "are completely analogous." In Example 1 and Lemma 1, this corrigendum provides a counterexample to Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1) on the general domain R. We also propose a way of correcting the result on the general domain R by strengthening independence of irrelevant objects: in addition to requiring that the chosen allocation should depend only on preferences over the set of available objects (which always includes the null object), we add a situation in which the allocation should also be invariant when preferences over the null object change. Finally, we offer a short proof of the corrected result that uses the established result of Theorem 1 for the restricted domain R 0 .
House allocation with variable resources
For completeness and the convenience of the reader, we briefly state the model and the main result of Ehlers and Klaus (2003) .
Let N denote a finite set of agents, |N | ≥ 2. Let K denote a set of potential real objects. Not receiving any real object is called "receiving the null object." Let 0 represent the null object. Each agent i ∈ N is equipped with a preference relation R i over all objects K ∪ {0}. Given x, y ∈ K ∪ {0}, x R i y means that agent i weakly prefers x to y, and x P i y means that agent i strictly prefers x to y. We assume that R i is strict, i.e., R i is a linear order over K ∪ {0}. Let R denote the class of all linear orders over K ∪ {0}, and R N the set of (preference) profiles R = (R i ) i∈N such that for all i ∈ N , R i ∈ R. Given K ⊆ K ∪ {0}, let R i | K denote the restriction of R i to K and R| K = (R i | K ) i∈N . Let R 0 R denote the class of preference relations where the null object is the worst object. That is, if R i ∈ R 0 , then all real objects are "goods": for all x ∈ K , x P i 0.
An allocation is a list a = (a i ) i∈N such that for all i ∈ N , a i ∈ K ∪ {0}, and none of the real objects in K is assigned to more than one agent. Note that 0, the null object, can be assigned to any number of agents and that not all real objects have to be assigned. Let A denote the set of all allocations. Let H denote the set of all non-empty subsets H of K . A (house allocation) problem consists of a preference profile R ∈ R N and a set of real objects H ∈ H. Note that the associated set of available objects H ∪ {0} includes the null object which is available in any economy. An (allocation) rule is a function ϕ :
By feasibility, each agent receives an available object. Given i ∈ N , we call ϕ i (R, H ) the allotment of agent i at ϕ(R, H ).
A natural requirement for a rule is that the chosen allocation depends only on preferences over the set of available objects.
Independence of irrelevant objects: For all
Next, a rule chooses only (Pareto) efficient allocations.
A rule satisfies resource-monotonicity, if more resources become available, all agents (weakly) gain.
Resource-monotonicity: For all
{1, . . . , |N |} → N specifies the inheritance of object x. An inheritance table is a profile π = (π x ) x∈K specifying the inheritance of each real object. We call an inheritance table π a mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange inheritance table if it induces a partition of agents into singletons and pairs S = (S 1 , . . . , S m ) and the corresponding mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange inheritance rule ϕ (π,S) works as follows (see Ehlers and Klaus 2003, Sect. 3 for details).
First, if S 1 is a singleton, then the agent who initially owns all objects picks his best available object. If S 1 specifies a pair of agents, the two agents who initially own all objects obtain their best objects if these are different; otherwise whoever owns the (common) best available object is assigned that object, and the other agent picks his best available object from the remaining objects. This process of either dictatorship or pairwise-exchange steps is repeated with S 2 , S 3 , etc. for the set of remaining available objects after each step.
For a formal definition of mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange inheritance table we refer to Ehlers and Klaus (2003 H ) and (R, H ) are not of the same "type" (a) or (b).
First, suppose that (R, H ) is of type (a) and (R, H ) is of type (b). Then, by definition of ϕ, ϕ 3 (R, H ) = x. Now, if ϕ 3 (R, H ) = x, then resource-monotonicity is satisfied because the order in the serial dictatorship between agents 1 and 2 is unchanged in (a) and (b). Otherwise ϕ 3 (R, H ) = x and because (R, H ) is of type (b), at ϕ(R, H ) agent 1 or agent 3 receives an object in H \ H and the other agent either receives x or also an object in H \ H . Now, resource-monotonicity is satisfied because agents 1 and 3 are weakly better off and agent 2 can choose from a larger set of objects under (R, H ) than under (R, H ) .
Second, suppose that (R, H ) is of type (b) and (R, H ) is of type (a). Then, by definition of ϕ, ϕ 3 (R, H ) = x. Since (R, H ) is of type (b) and (R, H ) not of type (a), we must have x ∈ H \ H . Then, ϕ 3 (R, H ) R 3 ϕ 3 (R, H ) and both agents 1 and 2 can choose from a larger set of objects at (R, H ) than at (R, H ). Since the order in the serial dictatorship between agents 1 and 2 is unchanged in (a) and (b), resource-monotonicity is satisfied.
Correction of Theorem 1
In order to correct Theorem 1 on domain R N , we strengthen independence of irrelevant objects by additionally requiring that if only the ranking of the null object changes below agents' allotments, then the allocation does not change.
Strong independence of irrelevant objects: For all
We are now ready to present a correction of Theorem 1 on Domain R. Theorem 2 Let |K | > |N |. On the domain R N , mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules are the only rules satisfying efficiency, strong independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity.
We next offer a short proof of Theorem 2 that uses the established result of Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1) for the restricted domain R N 0 . Before proving Theorem 2, we establish two useful implications of efficiency and resource-monotonicity.
The following lemma states that efficiency and resource-monotonicity imply that taking out an unassigned object does not change the assigned allocation. Proof Suppose by contradiction that (R, H ) ∈ R N × H is such that for all i ∈ N , ϕ i (R, H ) = x ∈ H and ϕ(R, H ) = ϕ(R, H \ {x}) . Note that object x is neither assigned at (R, H ) nor at (R, H \ {x}), i.e., ϕ(R, H ) is feasible for (R, H \ {x}) .
Hence, by efficiency, there exists an agent j ∈ N such that ϕ j (R, H \{x}) P j ϕ j (R, H ) , contradicting resource-monotonicity.
The following lemma states that efficiency and resource-monotonicity imply that adding an object that none of the agents who are assigned objects would prefer will not change the assigned allocation for these agents. For (R, H ) ∈ R N × H, we denote the set of agents who are assigned objects in H at ϕ (R, H ) by N + (ϕ, R, H 
Lemma 3 Let ϕ be an efficient and resource-monotonic rule and (R, H ) 
is not assigned to any agent in N + (ϕ, R, H ) (it might be assigned to any of the agents who did not receive an object). Since ϕ(R, H ) is efficient and only agents in N + (ϕ, R, H ) received objects in H , the only way to satisfy resource-monotonicity is to not change the assigned allocation for agents in
Proof of Theorem 2
Throughout the proof, when referring to Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1) , we refer to Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1) on the domain R N 0 . It is easy to verify that mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules satisfy efficiency, strong independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity since no more than two agents "trade" at any step. In proving the converse, let |K | > |N | and let ϕ be a rule satisfying efficiency, strong independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity. By Ehlers and Klaus (2003, Theorem 1) , ϕ equals a mixed dictator-pairwiseexchange rules on the domain R N 0 . Hence, on the domain R N 0 , ϕ = ϕ (π,S) . Suppose, by contradiction, that on the general domain R N , ϕ = ϕ (π,S) . Then, there exists (R, H ) ∈ R N × H such that ϕ(R, H ) = ϕ (π,S) (R, H ) . In particular, by efficiency, there exists j ∈ N such that ϕ j (R, H ) P j ϕ (π,S) j (R, H ). Let i∈N {ϕ i (R, H )} \ {0} = H . By Lemma 2, for all i ∈ N , ϕ i (R, H ) = ϕ i (R, H ) . By resource-monotonicity of ϕ (π,S) and H ⊆ H, ϕ (π,S) j (R, H ) R j ϕ (π,S) j (R, H ). Thus, ϕ j (R, H ) P j ϕ (π,S) j (R, H ) and at ϕ(R, H ) all real objects are assigned. To simplify notation, and without loss of generality, we assume that H = H in the sequel.
Case 1 (|H | = |N |): If |H | = |N |, then we move the null object to the bottom of each agent's preference relation and obtain a profile R ∈ R N 0 . Formally, let R be such that R | H = R| H and for all i ∈ N and all x ∈ H, x P i 0. Note that for all i ∈ N , ϕ i (R, H ) = 0 and by efficiency, for all i ∈ N , ϕ i (R, H ) P i 0. Using (ii) in strong independence of irrelevant objects we then have ϕ(R, H ) = ϕ(R , H ). By
